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Biocultural diversityAbstract Efforts to preserve fragile ecosystems that focus on removing human intervention from
the environment risk ignoring the political and social systems underlying environmentally destruc-
tive economic activities. In contrast, a biocultural diversity perspective allows for environmental
protection to be approached with sensitivity to human needs. This paper explores the case of
Karanrang Island, Spermonde Archipelago, South Sulawesi, Indonesia, where ﬁshing with toxins
and bombs is proving detrimental to ﬁsh stocks and the surrounding coral reefs. Interviews with
Karanrang ﬁshers reveal that these destructive ﬁshing practices are bound up with the region’s
punggawa-sawi political and social system of patron–client relationships. The paper shows how
the informal governance operating through these patron–client relationships traps ﬁshers into
destructive ﬁshing practices. It is argued that environmental protection efforts should take into
account political and social contexts.
ª 2014 Institution for Marine and Island Cultures, Mokpo National University. Production and hosting
by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
This paper discusses the intersection between an informal gov-
ernance system and environmental protection in a small Indo-
nesian ﬁshing community. Through an examination of the case
of Karanrang Island, Indonesia, we will draw conclusions on
the how local politics and society can affect attempts to protect
the environment.Recent research has placed focus on the importance of bio-
cultural diversity – that is, on the links between biological
diversity and cultural diversity ‘‘in landscapes where tradi-
tional livelihoods, and ultimately human survival, are based
on natural resources’’ (Hong, 2013). This recognition of the
role of people in the environment and vice versa presents a
remedy to the ‘classic’ environmental conservation approach
of seeking to remove humans from the environment. By seek-
ing to bypass the tension that can exist between local human
and environmental needs (see, for example, Hayward and
Mosse, 2012), this latter approach risks privileging the metro-
politan and urban experience at the expense of rural and
peripheral society. ‘Classic’ approaches to conservation also
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tion, which – though perhaps partially achievable at an
ultra-local scale – ignores the wider ﬂows of capital, labour,
power, and pollution that threaten the sustainability of even
the best cordoned-off nature reserves and marine protection
areas. There is, furthermore, considerable evidence that,
besides being ethically questionable, environmental conserva-
tion tactics that do not seek to engage with affected human
communities are often exercises in failure (Szuster and
Albasri, 2010). Even when an environmental conservation pro-
ject is successful, failure to take local cultural values into
account can risk the sustainability of the environmental pro-
tection measure itself as the local society comes under pressure
due its exclusion from traditional human-environment prac-
tices and interactions (Okano and Matsuda, 2013).
A focus on legalistic solutions to environmental conserva-
tion may fail to effectively protect the ecosystem in question if
they ignore the root causes of the unsustainable human behav-
iour. Bioculturally sensitive conservation strategies that take a
‘‘holistic’’ approach to environmental protection (Makhzoumi
et al., 2012) may have better success in safeguarding both envi-
ronmental and human needs. Along these lines, the present
paper explores the case of Karanrang Island in the Spermonde
Archipelago, South Sulawesi, Indonesia, where action is
necessary to preserve a coral reef ecosystem – which forms the
bedrock of the local economy – from the detrimental effects of
human activity but where legalistic conservation tactics are
proving ineffective. We will highlight how patron–client rela-
tionships have created a local system of informal governance
that encourages destructive ﬁshing practices.
Environmentally unsustainable practices represent an
immediate economic threat to communities that are directly
dependent on exploitation of local natural resources. We shall
argue, however, that policies focused on combatting unsustain-
able natural resource exploitation by local communities may
miss the point, for such practices are tied up with wider polit-
ical, social, and economic realities.
Environment and economy of the Spermonde Archipelago,
Indonesia
Indonesia is the world’s largest and most populous archipelago.
The country’s tropical location, long coastline (81,000 km), and
massive marine territory (5.8 million km2) result in Indonesian
waters possessing a spectacular level of marine biodiversity,
which can be said to represent an inherent environmental good.
Expanses of mangrove forest in Indonesia’s coastal waters serve
as natural breakwaters and help protect the land from the
onslaught of waves, lessening erosion. The mangrove forests
also protect coral reefs by ﬁltering and neutralising toxic chem-
icals from shore before they reach the oceanic ecosystem.
Indonesia is highly dependent on its marine economy.
Besides an increasing reliance on ﬁsh and shrimp farming
(mariculture), which have proved destructive to the mangrove
forests over recent decades, the country possesses a substantial
offshore ﬁshing industry. Together, mariculture and ﬁshing
help fuel Indonesia’s wider economy by generating foreign
exchange through exports. Farmed ﬁsh and shrimp are
exported for foreign consumption, and the reefs themselves
are a major source of live food ﬁsh and ornamental aquarium
ﬁsh globally. The health of the mangrove and coral reef ecosys-tems is thus of direct importance to the country’s economy as a
whole, even disregarding their intangible environmental value
or their value to the economy’s secondary sector.
Fishing also plays a vital role in the local context, being the
major source of employment and food for local consumption
in many of Indonesia’s coastal communities. Around 60% of
Indonesia’s population lives and works near the coast. Indone-
sia’s coastal settlements are economically and socially vulnera-
ble, with high population densities placing pressure on local
ecosystems and contributing to poor health due to limited
access to clean water, sanitation, and health facilities. In addi-
tion, most people in coastal areas are vulnerable to ﬂoods and
storms. Even the level of education in coastal areas is lower
than that in inland areas as a whole.
These problems are exacerbated in the case of rural or
peripheral coastal communities. In a large archipelagic state
like Indonesia, many such communities are located a consider-
able distance from and possess difﬁcult access to major popu-
lation centres, resulting in local economies that are dependent
on very narrow import and export streams and are thus highly
vulnerable to the vagaries of external supply and demand.
This is evident in the case of the island of Karanrang (pop-
ulation around 2960), located in the Spermonde Archipelago
(population around 100,000) off the coast of Sulawesi Island.
The majority of Karanrang Islanders are of Bugis-Makassar
ethnicity and speak the Makassar language. Karanrang can
be reached by a 2–3 h motor boat trip from port city of
Makassar, capital of the South Sulawesi province. Makassar
is the largest city of Sulawesi Island, with a population of over
1.3 million, and there is a sense in which its size exacerbates
Karanrang’s isolation, for from the perspective of a Makassar
resident, Karanrang is a place of very little importance. As
part of the Pangkep District, Karanrang is administered by a
municipal government based on the South Sulawesi mainland,
but some police ofﬁcers and minor government ofﬁcials are
also resident on the island of Barrang Lompo, around 22 km
from Karanrang. Karanrang is thus in a position of multiple
peripherality, affected by the complex dynamics of archipe-
lagic travel and transport (see, for example, Grydehøj and
Hayward, 2014; Spilanis et al., 2012).
Destructive ﬁshing practices in Spermonde
Indonesia has genuine problems enforcing its ﬁshery zone, and
there is signiﬁcant illegal ﬁshing by foreign-ﬂagged vessels. The
present article, however, focuses on illegal ﬁshing carried out
by Spermonde islanders themselves.
Spermonde’s coral reef ecosystem is threatened not just by
‘overﬁshing’ in an abstract sense but also by particular destruc-
tive ﬁshing practices: the use of toxins (potassium cyanide) and
bombs that destroy marine life.
The use of explosives (blast ﬁshing) has a long history in
Indonesia, dating back to at least World War II, when ﬁshers
were taught the technique by Japanese soldiers. However, the
actual technology involved in blast ﬁshing has changed over
the years, shifting from dynamite to industrial explosives to
fertiliser-and-kerosene bombs (Pet-Soede and Erdmann,
1998a, pp. 4–5). Blast ﬁshing has the advantage of saving con-
siderably on labour. Bombs are, however, dangerous to the
ﬁshers themselves, resulting in frequent physical injuries. They
are also expensive: In their 1997 study, Pet-Soede and
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over half of their income on the purchase of explosives.
Toxins are used primarily for ornamental ﬁsh and for
catching live food ﬁsh for export, such as grouper and hump-
head wrasse. Potassium cyanide is squirted at ﬁsh in order to
stun them and allow for easy collection. The export of live reef
ﬁsh for food emerged as a major industry with the develop-
ment of the Hong Kong market in the 1960s (Glaeser and
Glaser, 2011). Fishing with toxins dates from the mid-1980s,
when it was introduced to the area by ﬁshers on Hong Kong
and Taiwanese boats (Prasetiamartati, 2006, p. 9). Indonesia’s
ﬁshing export industry is centuries old and has long resulted in
differential valuations and targeting of speciﬁc species. Even
today, new species become targeted as a result of international
demand (Schwerdtner Ma´n˜ez and Paragay, 2013). However,
the advent of the (food and ornamental) live reef ﬁsh export
market has strongly incentivised the use of toxins (Pet-Soede
and Erdmann, 1998).
Both blast ﬁshing and use of toxins are environmentally
problematic because they affect more than just the target
catches. Use of explosives is indiscriminately lethal to ﬁsh,
coral, and unshelled invertebrates while use of toxins can be
fatal for both adult and juvenile ﬁsh, coral, and other inverte-
brates (Frey and Berkes, 2014; Fox and Caldwell, 2006). As a
result, reef habitats have been degraded and destroyed, and
there have been signiﬁcant reductions in the overall availability
of ﬁsh for export. Other types of illegal ﬁshing involve the use
of equipment that does not conform to regulations (for exam-
ple, nets with too small a mesh) and violations of site-speciﬁc
trawling bans. Such methods have resulted in a decrease in the
size of ﬁsh targeted for ﬁshing.
Preventing or at least reducing destructive ﬁshing around
Karanrang is necessary if the local ecosystem – and thus the
local ﬁshing culture and economy – is to be preserved.
Attempts have been made to empower community members
by encouraging them to participate directly in ﬁsheries policy
and raise awareness that management of marine resources is
not just about maximising catches but also about optimising
utilisation of these resources to balance economic and environ-
mental needs. This work has highlighted the extent to which
local societal structures are implicated in destructive ﬁshing.
Research methodology
In order to assess the dynamics of the local ﬁshing industry, a
research team from Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri under-
took ethnographic ﬁeldwork in Spermonde in 2010, with fol-
low-up observation in 2011, 2012, and 2013. The
ethnographic ﬁeldwork included small-group interviews with
229 ﬁshers on Karanrang. The ﬁshers attended these informal
interviews, held in the village ofﬁce, during their spare time
and were provided with snacks and meals, depending on the
time of the interview. Respondents were asked questions about
the Indonesian government’s social welfare programme and its
programme aimed at minimising the practice of blast ﬁshing.
Because blast ﬁshing is illegal and is known to be especially
prevalent around Karanrang, special precautions were taken
both to protect the ﬁshers and to ensure the accuracy of the
collected data: Fishers were not asked directly whether they
engaged in destructive ﬁshing practices, and data was instead
acquired through a relaxed, informal conversation. The
researchers also spoke with the village head.Structure of the Karanrang ﬁshing industry
In order to clarify the structure of the Karanrang ﬁshing indus-
try, it is important to recognise the range of actors involved in
it. We can divide these into direct and indirect actors (for a
more detailed examination of Spermonde ﬁshing actors, see
Radjawali, 2012).
Direct actors
Direct actors can be broadly classiﬁed into two categories: (1)
onshore owners of ﬁshing businesses, infrastructure, land,
housing, and equipment (hereafter, Owners) and (2) individu-
als who participate in ﬁshing activities aboard the boats
(Fishers).
Indirect actors
Indirect actors consist of: (1) investors who fund operations
and are often based in Makassar (Investors), (2) buyers who
purchase the catch and export it overseas and are often based
in Jakarta (Buyers), (3) suppliers of equipment and materials
(Suppliers), (4) police ofﬁcers based on Ballang Lompo
(Police), and (5) and public ofﬁcials involved in ﬁshing activi-
ties and based on Barrang Lompo and mainland Sulawesi
Island (Ofﬁcials).
These various actors are involved in the so-called pungga-
wa-sawi system of patron–client relationships, which ulti-
mately represents a system of informal governance in the
region. That is to say, although Karanrang and the other Sper-
monde islands are formally integrated into the Indonesian gov-
ernmental system, much of the actual social, economic, and
political activity that takes place here is guided by actors oper-
ating outside of this formal system. This is in part due to the
strength of the punggawa-sawi system itself and in part due
to the dysfunctionality of the state’s formal system of ﬁsheries
regulation (Ferse et al., 2012a, pp. 537–540).
Fishers are reliant on Owners not only for their land and
housing but also for materials and assets (onshore facilities,
boats, equipment, etc.) that are necessary for undertaking ﬁsh-
ing operations. Owners are also responsible for the safety and
security of the Fishers and their families. Owners thus take on
a degree of ﬁnancial risk. The Fishers on a boat are responsible
for distributing their catch among themselves – and then pay-
ing their Owner in ﬁsh for use of facilities, boats, equipment,
materials, housing, land, etc.
Since, in their relationship with Fishers, it is the Owners
who set the prices for buying (ﬁsh), selling (materials), and
renting (assets), they have a ﬁnancial incentive to balance
prices in such a way as to keep Fishers indebted to them. It
is thus that, in our research, many Fishers reported a constant
need to borrow money from their Owners, especially when,
during poor weather, the Fishers are stuck onshore. As
Radjawali (2012: 595) notes, when the weather improves,
and Fishers are able to resume work, they ﬁnd it necessary
to accept low prices from the Owners in order to repay their
debts. The result is a power imbalance, with Fishers trapped
in debt to Owners and unable to break the cycle of coerced
labour or veritable debt slavery (Prasetiamartati, 2006, pp.
12–13; Pelras, 2000). This is not to say that the Fishers are nec-
essarily desperately impoverished (Pet-Soede and Erdmann,
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security and other positives (Glaeser and Glaser, 2011; Ferse
et al., 2012b), only that Fishers possess limited practical ability
to change livelihoods or turn to ﬁshing techniques not
supported by Owners.
Of course, an Owner’s ability to make a proﬁt from ﬁshing
operations is dependent on his own ability to sell ﬁsh at a good
price. Owners who run small-scale operations sell the catch to
small Buyers, i.e. middlemen who subsequently sell on to col-
lectors or wholesalers. An Owner who wishes to beneﬁt from
improved economies of scale and to skip the middlemen by
selling directly to larger Buyers needs to raise the necessary
additional capital for running a larger operation. This requires
the assistance of Investors, who are themselves paid in ﬁsh.
Karanrang Islanders are Muslims, and most of its Fishers
are married men. They engage primarily in the following ﬁsh-
ing activities: angling, sea cucumber harvesting, ﬁshing with
toxins, and blast ﬁshing. Of these, angling stands out for not
requiring a great level of technological sophistication. It is usu-
ally carried out by Fishers who have little access to capital and
cannot afford to buy or are unable to rent a motor boat.
Instead, such Fishers go out in small non-motorised boats
and undertake line ﬁshing around the island, at the edge of
the reef. They mainly target pelagic ﬁsh, such as snapper, kite,
coral trout, and grouper but sometimes also ﬁsh for squid by
night.
In contrast, the other dominant ﬁshing methods require
resources that must be sourced from off of the island and
are thus relatively capital intensive. For instance, the harvest-
ing of sea cucumbers involves going out in motor boats to dee-
per waters (20–30 m) and using scuba gear (air tanks, masks,
and ﬁns). Like angling, sea cucumber harvesting is not inher-
ently unsustainable: If appropriate numbers of animals are
taken, such ﬁshing need not be incompatible with environmen-
tal conservation.
The same is not true for ﬁshing with toxins and bombs.
Fishing with toxins offers the potential for high ﬁnancial gain,
but it also requires expensive technology inasmuch as, besides
the necessity of paying for a motor boat and scuba gear, one
must also acquire the potassium cyanide itself. This is also
the case with blast ﬁshing, which requires a motor boat, masks,
bomb materials, and sometimes scuba gear. Three or four
Fishers go out in a motor boat and – after gauging the number
of ﬁsh in the water through a mask – set off bombs underwa-
ter. The subsequent explosions stun or kill ﬁsh in the vicinity,
and a number of these ﬁsh then ﬂoat to the surface for easy
collection. In light weather conditions, blast ﬁshing is under-
taken quite far offshore to the east of the island, but in heavier
weather, it is undertaken close to shore to the west of the
island. Fishers use bombs either on their own or alongside
other equipment. Explosives are usually placed in jerry cans
or similar containers, resulting in bombs that allow for easy
collection of the catch. Some Fishers use bombs only in situa-
tions when these are more productive than legal equipment
such as traps, trolling lines, extended lines, trawl nets, and
seines. Large-scale ﬁshing operations make use of further assis-
tive equipment, such as basic scuba gear while small-scale
Fishers simply dive with masks when collecting ﬁsh following
a blast.
Fishers who engage in destructive ﬁshing practices typically
spend the morning 10–11 km offshore and return home in the
afternoon. Fishing with toxins and bombs around the islandhas taken place for decades, as is evident from the deteriorated
condition of the reef ecosystem. As a result, Fishers have
moved increasingly farther offshore.
Of the 229 Karanrang ﬁshers who took part in this study,
194 (65%) use bombs and/or toxins in their ﬁshing. Of these,
133 (69%) use bombs, 52 (27%) use toxins, and 9 (5%) use
both bombs and toxins. Further data obtained from the 133
respondents who use bombs shows that approximately 44%
of this destructive ﬁshing takes place far offshore, 43% takes
place directly above the coral reefs, and 4% takes place near
shore. A further 9% of the ﬁshing takes place at the outer edge
of the reef or on the open water.
Much destructive ﬁshing takes place on or near the reefs
because these are home to the most economically valuable ﬁsh
and because the relatively weak water ﬂow makes it easier to
collect one’s catch using nets. Fishing in the non-reef areas is
dominated by line ﬁshing. Respondents also report that
Karanrang ﬁshing practices are seasonally conditioned (see
also Radjawali, 2012, p. 550). During the season dominated
by a west wind, use of explosives is concentrated in the vicinity
of the central Spermonde islands, while during the season
dominated by the east wind, explosives are more often used
in the more peripheral islands in the archipelago (about a
four-hour boat trip for most ﬁshers).
Given Karanrang’s peripheral location, it is necessary to
import many supplies not only for ﬁshing in general (such as
motor boats, nets, line, fuel, and scuba gear) but also for
destructive ﬁshing in particular (such as potassium cyanide,
fertiliser, detonators, and fuses). Karanrang respondents admit
to constructing their own bombs, but potentially due to the
illegal nature of destructive ﬁshing, they are reluctant to reveal
their direct source of potassium cyanide and bomb materials.
However, respondents from other Spermonde island commu-
nities assert that Fishers on Karanrang receive these materials
from their Owners and that the Owners in turn source these
materials from Suppliers at Paotere Harbour in Makassar.
Of the 133 Karanrang Fisher respondents who use explosives,
79 (59%) state that the explosives they use come primarily
from specialised traders who have a close relationship with
the Investors. A number of respondents implicate local Police
in the distribution of explosives.
Of course, the complete distribution network of Suppliers is
very wide, extending from those who produce component
materials abroad to inter-regional brokers to direct traders
on the island. Since use of explosives and toxins in this manner
is banned by the government, local Suppliers use a variety of
methods to shield themselves from scrutiny, for instance by
working with Investors in the distribution of the illegal mate-
rials. In order to protect their investments, Investors some-
times lobby Ofﬁcials and deal with the Police in the event
that the direct actors’ operations run into barriers. There are
indications that corrupt Ofﬁcials cooperate with Fishers who
use explosives and that some local Police fail to take action
against Fishers who break the law. Some Fishers complain
of police ofﬁcers collecting illegal ‘taxes’ at the ﬁshing dock
on the mainland or during surprise visits to Fishers’ homes.
Although such activity by Police and Ofﬁcials is clearly illegal,
it is part of a ‘‘prosecution insurance network’’ (Radjawali,
2012, pp. 553–555) that ultimately protects Fishers, Owners,
Investors, and Buyers from prosecution. The strength of this
network of actors allows it to function as an alternative –
and indeed, dominant – governance system.
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(2002) from elsewhere in Sulawesi: Live ﬁsh export businesses
(Buyers) provide Fishers with cyanide and equipment free of
charge, encouraging Fishers to become indebted to motor boat
providers (Owners) and dependent upon the (often-purchas-
able) goodwill of Police and Ofﬁcials. Generally speaking:
Poor ﬁshers are the ﬁrst to suffer penalties and to assume
the greatest risks in live ﬁshing, and they are also excluded
from the highest live ﬁsh proﬁts and from protection from
prosecution. Rules as they are enforced within the entrepre-
neurial Indonesian bureaucracy tend to enrich bureaucrats
and traders while failing to protect either species or citizens
(Lowe, 2002, pp. 14–15).
Because of their own ability to set prices for ﬁsh, to control
distribution of supplies, to inﬂuence law enforcement, and to
turn the ﬂow of capital on or off, Investors are themselves
patrons to the Owners within the punggawa-sawi system.
Drivers of destructive ﬁshing
Destructive ﬁshing is difﬁcult to prevent for a variety of rea-
sons. Since destructive ﬁshing is illegal on account of its envi-
ronmental impact, government preventative efforts have
traditionally rested on public environmental awareness and
law enforcement. Environmental awareness is indeed a major
issue inasmuch as many ﬁshers lack an understanding as to
why destructive ﬁshing methods are problematic in practice.
Among the research’s 229 respondents, 12% never completed
primary school, 77% possess primary school educations, and
the remainder have post-primary educations. There is a posi-
tive correlation between lack of education and lack of aware-
ness of the importance of environmental conservation. A
common perception of marine resources among the ﬁshers is
that ‘The number of ﬁsh in the sea will run out once the trees
on land have run out of leaves’ – i.e. never. With this mindset,
it is little wonder that concepts of sustainable development
have difﬁculty gaining traction.
That said, the negative impacts of destructive ﬁshing prac-
tices are increasingly recognised locally. In the words of one
Karanrang Fisher, ‘‘We know the impact of ﬁshing and
bombs. Actually, many of our friends have lost their arms
when a bomb has exploded before it was thrown. We also
know the environmental impact, such as the destruction of
coral reefs, but because of our economy, we need to keep
catching ﬁsh by using bombs and stunning.’’
Given that the use of bombs and toxins is illegal, continued
destructive ﬁshing is only possible when combined with weak
or uneven law enforcement. The data collected for this study
suggests that just 10% of police cases involving destructive
ﬁshing in Spermonde make it to court. It is regarded as com-
mon knowledge that the local Police are engaged in a culture
of corruption and collusion, which causes them to protect
destructive ﬁshing activities.
The informal governance system rooted in the punggawa-
sawi system drives such corruption and collusion by subverting
formal governmental structures of authority: The needs of the
patrons are elevated above those of the law. When viewed
from the perspective of this informal governance system, the
absence of rule of law is positive for the Fishers themselves:
Given the debt incurred by Fishers to Owners, many Fisherscould not ﬁsh proﬁtably using legal methods. As one Fisher
puts it, ‘‘Using toxins and bombs, we can easily catch reef ﬁsh
of high economic value and ornamental ﬁsh without it taking a
long time to get the ﬁsh. This is how we can make money suf-
ﬁcient for our daily lives in the not-too-distant future.’’ In
other words, the legal (and less environmentally destructive)
nets that are currently available to local Fishers cannot ensure
large enough catches to cover the Fishers’s expenses. There is a
vicious circle involved here: Foreign and domestic demand is
increasing, leading to increasing prices, at the same time as
destructive ﬁshing is reducing ﬁsh populations, causing catches
to decrease. This further incentivises maximising catches by
ﬁshing destructively while simultaneously disincentivising legal
ﬁshing, which becomes increasingly difﬁcult to carry out suc-
cessfully as ﬁsh populations decline.
Conclusion
Spermonde ﬁshers have begun to realise that their catches have
been declining, though this is popularly attributed not only to
ﬁshing with bombs and toxins but also to other unsustainable
ﬁshing practices, such as the use of ﬁne-mesh nets. Although
the Karanrang Fishers are aware that destructive ﬁshing is ille-
gal, they argued until recently that ﬁshing with bombs and tox-
ins provided fast, efﬁcient, and practical yields. Furthermore,
the lack of alternative employment in the archipelago and
the economic demands placed on the Fishers as a result of their
continual indebtedness to Owners and Investors drives them to
focus on the short-term maximisation of catches. Evidence
from other research (Prasetiamartati, 2006, p. 18) suggests that
even though many Fishers who do not use explosives or toxins
are aware of the destructive nature of these methods, because
these tend to small, independent Fishers, they have difﬁculty
effectively opposing or protesting against the use of destructive
methods by more organised ﬁshing operations. Such organised
ﬁshing operations are protected through their embeddedness in
the punggawa-sawi system and its role as a system of informal
governance.
The government of Indonesia feels that the Spermonde
Archipelago’s marine resources should be used for the beneﬁt
of society, with an aim toward sustainability and environmen-
tal preservation. Prevention of destructive ﬁshing practices
should be grounded in the rule of law, and law enforcement
should be taken seriously. But how can the rule of law be
maintained when the societal and economic cards are stacked
against it? A number of government programmes to increase
environmental protection exist. For instance, in some regions,
capital, equipment, and medical and housing support are pro-
vided to small-scale operators. Public attention has been cap-
tured by the introduction of free educational programmes
from the primary to upper-secondary levels. One programme
speciﬁcally aimed at Fishers has involved the introduction of
seaweed farming as an alternative livelihood. The cultivation
of seaweed could prove even more proﬁtable than ﬁshing with
explosives. The fact that seaweed can be killed by the toxins
used for ﬁshing has the potential to drive home to Fishers
the negative impacts of such destructive ﬁshing. As a result,
many Fishers have stopped using destructive ﬁshing techniques
and have, indeed, become environmental activists.
These Indonesian government initiatives represent attempts
to get to grips with the underlying causes of environmentally
Informal governance through patron–client relationships and destructive ﬁshing in Spermonde Archipelago, Indonesia 59unsustainable economic activities and thus a recognition of the
links between environment and culture. It remains to be seen
whether such efforts will succeed in empowering communities
such as that on Karanrang and allowing them to ‘make the
most of smallness’ and sustainably exploit the community
capacity advantages that come from small island status
(Grydehøj, 2011).
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